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Since agricultural products are produced by numerous and often scat-
tered individual producers, the marketing and bargaining position of
individual producers will be adversely affected unless they are free to
join together voluntarily in cooperative associations .... Membership
t Program Leader, Legal, Policy & Taxation, Agricultural Cooperative Service,
United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. The material in this arti-
cle does not represent official policy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Instead,
this article is presented only to provide information and stimulate discussion.
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of a producer in... a cooperative association ... can only be mean-
ingful if a handler of agricultural products is required to bargain in
good faith with an agricultural cooperative association ...as the
representative of[its] members. .... 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Farmers 2 are too often "price takers, not price makers."13
When an individual farmer sits down at the table to negotiate
terms of sale for this year's crop, the buyer frequently repre-
sents a major agribusiness firm whose resources dwarf those of
the farmer. The purchasing firm may have a multitude of po-
tential sellers, often times located throughout the United
States or even the world. The farmer may have only one, or a
limited number, of potential buyers. As a result, the farmer
must take the price that is offered. Farmers can respond to this
marketplace imbalance by joining together in cooperative4 bar-
gaining associations to negotiate with buyers on a collective
basis.5
This Article will examine the rationale for cooperative
farmer bargaining and explore federal and state statutes that
promote collective negotiation activities by producers. In ad-
dition, this Article will discuss federal pre-emption of state
laws by the Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) and will ex-
plain policy options for better marketplace balance and steps
for farmers to take to achieve a fair price for their products.
1. Declaration of Policy, Minnesota Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act
of 1973, MINN. STAT. § 17.692 (1992).
2. A farmer is defined as one "engaged in agricultural pursuits as a livelihood or
business." Skinner v. Dingwell, 134 F.2d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1943).
3. "[Farmers] are price takers, not price makers. They are often in a position of
having but one or two buyers for their production; rarely do several buyers compete
for what they produce." RALPH B. BUNJE, COOPERATIVE FARM BARGAINING AND PRICE
NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. COOP. INFO. REPORT No. 26 40 (1980). Mr.
Bunje served for 25 years as president and manager of the California Cling Peach
Association.
4. A cooperative is "[a] corporation [or association] organized for the purpose
of rendering economic services, without gain to itself, to shareholders or members
who own and control it." United Grocers, Ltd. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 724,
733 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
5. "Bargaining cooperatives are coalitions of growers who horizontally inte-
grate in their selling activities for the purpose of negotiating terms of trade with
buyers of their raw product. Associations generally do not become involved in han-
dling the raw product, nor do they have any mechanism to control producer supply."
Julie Iskow, Grower-Processor Bargaining: How the Process Works Under State Laws, in AMER-
ICAN AGRIC. LAW ASS'N SYMPOSIUM MANUAL 12-1 (1992).
[Vol. 19
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This Article concludes by asserting that cooperative farm bar-
gaining would result in a more stable and prosperous farm
sector.
II. RATIONALE FOR COOPERATIVE FARMER BARGAINING
Individual farmers negotiate from a disadvantageous posi-
tion.6 Farmers who join together to form a producer7 bargain-
ing association improve their bargaining position five ways.
First, a bargaining association helps to improve a farmer's bar-
gaining position in relation to the farmer's relative size and as-
sets.8 A commercial buyer has the economic power and size to
overwhelm an individual farmer.9 An association, representing
a significant share of grower production, can approach all po-
tential buyers and negotiate on the combined strength of its
producer members.' 0
Second, a bargaining association can control the timing of
the sale of crops." Individual farmers are easy prey for a
buyer who is able to wait until late in the marketing cycle to
make an offer.12 An association can influence the timing of ne-
gotiations and develop sliding scale prices that reflect changes
in total production and thereby reduce the buyer's incentive to
manipulate timing. '
3
Third, a bargaining association would improve the market
intelligence available to farmers.' 4 Many individual farmers
lack the time to analyze the market in order to maximize profits
for their products.' 5 As a result, many farmers are forced to
rely on the buyer's market intelligence.' 6 An association, on
the other hand, can hire staff to develop accurate, timely mar-
6. BUNJE, supra note 3, at 40-42.
7. A "producer" is any person producing agricultural products as a farmer,
planter, rancher, dairyman, fruit, vegetable, or nut grower. 7 U.S.C. § 2302(b)
(1988). However, those producing cotton or tobacco are exempted from the Act. Id.
§ 2302(e). The Act applies to all producers, including individuals, partnerships, cor-
porations, or associations. Id. § 2302(c).
8. BuNJE, supra note 3, at 40.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 41.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
1993]
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ket information. 17
Fourth, a bargaining association gives farmer's products a
"home."' 8 If farmers must have a home for their produce, and
there are a limited number of buyers, farmers can be forced to
compromise on terms of sale, price, or both.' 9 An association
can help farmers develop a market plan to control the prod-
uct's market and the timing of entry into the market.2 °
Finally, a bargaining association can control the final terms
of a sale.2' When negotiating with individual farmers, buyers
can delay payment to make maximum use of grower's re-
sources to finance the crop.2 2 A bargaining association, how-
ever, can force buyers to pay in a timely manner, thus
sheltering farmers' resources.23
Lawmakers have recognized that a marketplace imbalance
exists and have taken steps to enhance the producer's eco-
nomic position. The Agricultural Fair Practices laws enacted
on both the state and federal levels provide inducements for
producers to gain market strength through group action.24
III. FEDERAL STATUTES
A. Sherman Act
While farmers may choose to negotiate with processors on a
cooperative basis, many remain independent business people.
However, antitrust laws constrain their collective conduct. A
brief sketch of applicable antitrust law provides a foundation
for the existing public policy support of collective negotiation
by farmers.
In 1890, the Sherman Act, the first antitrust statute, was en-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 42.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 (AFPA) was passed despite oppo-
sition from processors and handlers. The AFPA does not allow processors or han-
dlers to prevent association membership or discriminate against member-growers
with respect to prices and other terms of trade. ISKOW, supra note 5, at 12-2. The
Capper-Volstead Act enables agricultural producers to act collectively and jointly
market their products without violating federal anti-trust laws. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-
292 (1988).
[Vol. 19
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acted.25 The Sherman Act remains the most important limita-
tion on group action by agricultural producers.2 6 Section one
of Sherman makes it a criminal felony to contract, combine, or
conspire to restrain trade.27 Section two provides that any per-
son who monopolizes or attempts to monopolize any part of
commerce is guilty of a felony.28
The Sherman Act does not contain clear and concise lan-
guage. The statute fails to define key terms such as "restrain
trade" and "monopolize. ' 29 Further, a literal reading of sec-
tion one would paralyze commerce. Every contract limits the
freedom of the parties and therefore restrains trade in some
manner. Thus, the courts devised the "rule of reason" and the
"rule of per se illegality" to apply the Sherman Act on a case-
by-case basis.
1. Rule of Reason
The "rule of reason ' 30 as applied to the Sherman Act, pro-
hibits conduct which "unreasonably" restrains trade or mono-
polizes commerce. 3' The United States Supreme Court
adopted the rule of reason to apply the Sherman Act in a logi-
25. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1988). "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1.
26. See id.
27. Id. "Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination
or conspiracy hereby declared [by §§ 1-7 of this Title] to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .... " Id.
28. Id. § 2. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id.
29. Restraint of trade means unreasonable restraints of trade which are illegal per
se restraints interfering with free competition in business and commercial transac-
tions which tend to restrict production, affect prices, or otherwise control market to
detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services. Klor's v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, 255 F.2d 214, 230 (9th Cir. 1958). Monopoly, as prohibited by Section
two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, has two elements: (1) Possession of monopoly
power in relevant market, and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570-71 (1966).
30. Under the rule of reason, the legality of restraint on trade is determined by
weighing all factors, such as the history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy and the purpose or end sought to be at-
tained. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 463
(D.C. 1975) (citing Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
31. See S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM, et al., Federal Antitrust Laws 14 (4th ed.
19931
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cal manner.3 2 The courts have never determined, however,
whether collective negotiation by individual farmers consti-
tutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. Nevertheless, the
courts developed a second test that unmistakably limits such
conduct.
2. Rule of Per Se Illegality
Activities such as price fixing and dividing markets are
plainly anti-competitive and are thus labeled "illegal per se.'"
Unfortunately, agricultural producers required special protec-
tion from the rule of per se illegality34 because the main pur-
poses of cooperative bargaining and marketing-e.g., to agree
on pricing policy and to whom they will sell products-were
considered illegal per se. s5
B. Clayton Act (Section Six)
Congress first recognized producers' needs for limited anti-
trust protection when it passed the Clayton Act in 1914.36 Sec-
tion six of Clayton exempted the mere organization of labor
and agricultural organizations without capital stock3 7 from the
rigors of antitrust scrutiny. 8
1981) (stating Section one of the Sherman Act only prohibits contracts, combinations
or conspiracies that unreasonably or unduly restrain trade).
32. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911); Board of
Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
33. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940). For a discussion of the
applicability of the per se rule under Minnesota antitrust law, see Minnesota. v. Alpine
Air Prod., 490 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
34. Certain types of business agreements are considered inherently anti-competi-
tive and injurious to the public without any need to determine if the agreement has
actually injured market competition. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1142 (6th ed. 1990).
35. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908) (stating Sherman Act makes
no distinction between classes and does not exempt organizations of farmers and
laborers); Reeves v. Docarah Farmers' Coop. Soc., 140 N.W. 844, 848 (Iowa 1913)
(holding hog producers cooperative was an illegal restraint of trade where it required
members to forfeit profits to cooperative if members sold produce to any other buyer
than the cooperative); Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 39 N.E. 651, 656 (Ill.
1895) (holding milk producer associations were within the purview of the Sherman
Act).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988).
37. Capital stock is all shares representing ownership of a business, including
preferred stock and common stock. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 209 (6th ed. 1990).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) provides:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organiza-
[Vol. 19
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Section six of the Clayton Act is a clear expression by Con-
gress that forming a cooperative is not a violation of the anti-
trust laws.39 Section six, however, does not indicate the types
of activity such an association may lawfully engage in.40 Fur-
thermore, the benefit of the Clayton Act is limited because it
only applies to non-stock 4' organizations.42
C. Capper-Volstead Act
43
Agricultural leaders recognized the shortcomings of the co-
operative provision in the Clayton Act."4 After several years of
intense congressional education, 4 5 farmers secured the enact-
ment of the Capper-Volstead Act in 1922.46 Capper-Volstead
has two provisions. Section one"7 sets out who is covered by
the Act, how they must operate to receive its protection, and
what actions are protected from antitrust liability. Section two
protects the public from harmful conduct by cooperatives.48
The Act empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to prevent
cooperatives from abusing their market power to unduly en-
hance the price of products they market."9 Once an abuse has
tions, institutes for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws.
Id.
39. Maryland Milk Producers Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466
(1960). Section six creates an exemption from anti-trust laws for agricultural cooper-
atives. Northern Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Central Cal. Lettuce Coop., 413 F. Supp.
984, 988 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
40. See Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 381,
384 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
41. Non-stock organizations are organizations that do not have capital stock. 15
U.S.C. § 17.
42. Id. Organizations must not be "conducted for profit" and must have been
formed for "purposes of mutual self help." Id.
43. Capper-Volstead extended the anti-trust exemption to agricultural
cooperatives with capital stock. Northern Cal. Supermarkets, 413 F. Supp. at 989. Thus,
cooperatives may operate as corporations while retaining the exemption. Id. at 993.
44. See MANAGING COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST RISK, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. COOP.
INFO. REPORT 38 10-11 (1989).
45. Id.
46. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1988).
47. Id. § 291.
48. See 7 U.S.C. § 292.
49. Id. A cooperative would abuse their market power by monopolizing or re-
straining trade. Id.
1993]
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been found, the Secretary of Agriculture shall issue an order
directing such association to cease and desist such conduct. 50
1. Qualification Standards
To be eligible for Capper-Volstead protection, a cooperative
must conform to specific organizational requirements. 5' First,
membership is limited to persons engaged in the production of
agricultural products.5 2 This group includes farmers, planters,
ranchers, dairymen, and nut or fruit growers. 53 Second, mem-
bers are not allowed more than one vote because of the
amount of stock owned or dividends on membership equity
may not exceed eight percent per year.5 4 Third, the value of
products marketed for members must exceed the value of
products marketed for nonmembers.55
2. Protected Activity 
56
Capper-Volstead gives producers marketing alternatives that
otherwise may be considered violations of antitrust laws. Pro-
ducer-members of a cooperative may agree among themselves
not only on the prices they will receive for their products but
also on all reasonable terms of sale.5 7
Producer-members of one cooperative can collectively mar-
ket their products with producer-members of another coopera-
tive by using a common marketing agent, 8 forming a
federation, 59 or simply working together to accomplish legiti-
50. Id
51. See Donald A. Frederick, Legal Rights of Producers in Negotiating With Processors,
in AMERICAN AGRIC. LAw Ass'N SYMPOSIUM MANUAL 10-2 (1992) (hereinafter Legal
Rights).
52. An agricultural producer is someone performing traditional farming activity
such as tilling the soil and tending to animals. See National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v.
United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978), aff'g 550 F.2d 1380 (1970).
53. See 7 U.S.C. § 291 (setting out who is covered, how they must operate and
what actions are protected).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983) (reviewing scope of Capper-Volstead Act).
57. Maryland Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466 (1960).
58. United States v. Maryland Coop. Milk Producers, Inc. 145 F. Supp. 151, 155
(D.C.D.C. 1956).
59. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29
(1962).
[Vol. 19
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mate marketing objectives. 6° Producers may, through a single
cooperative or in combination with other cooperatives, "obtain
monopoly power in a given market so long as it is achieved
through natural growth, voluntary confederation and without
resort to predatory or anti-competitive practices."'
The term "marketing" has been broadly interpreted in the
Capper-Volstead context. Producers, through their coopera-
tive, have integrated forward throughout the marketing chain.
Land O'Lakes,62 Ocean Spray, 63 Welch, 64 and Sun-Maid 65 are
cooperatives that place member's farm products right on the
grocery store shelf.66 Producers are "marketing" when their
activity is restricted to negotiating with processors on price
and terms of sale, without the cooperative ever taking title or
possession of any agricultural product.6 7 Marketing under
Capper-Volstead may involve the cooperative establishing a
price below which no member will sell the product.6"
3. Unprotected Activity
Capper-Volstead provides only limited antitrust protec-
tion.69 The Act allows producers an opportunity to enhance
60. Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods Inc., 497 F.2d
203, 209 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974).
61. Fairdale Farms v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2nd Cir. 1980).
62. Land O'Lakes, Inc., P.O. Box 116, Minneapolis, MN 55440.
63. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., One Ocean Spray Drive, Lakeville-Mid-
dleboro, MA 02349.
64. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, Inc., 2 South Portgage Street, Westfield, NY
14787.
65. Sun-Maid Growers of Cal., 13525 South Bethel Avenue, Kingsbury, CA
93631-9232.
66. See FRUIT AND VEGETABLE COOPS., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CooP. INFO. REPORT
1, SECTION 13 38-40, 44 (1990); DAIRY COOPS., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., COOPERATIVE
INFO. REPORT 1, SECTION 16 18 (1986).
67. Id. Marketing is: "[t]he aggregate of functions involved in transferring title
and in moving goods from producer to consumer, including among others buying, sell-
ing, storing, transporting, standardizing, financing, risk bearing, and supplying market
information." Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods Inc., 497
F.2d 203, 209 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974) (emphasis in original).
68. Northern Cal. Supermarkets v. Central Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413 F.
Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aft'd, 580 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1090 (1979).
69. The Act provides that the antitrust protection lies within sole discretion of
the Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 292. If the Secretary of Agriculture believes
that the association is monopolizing or restraining trade, the Secretary must serve a
complaint upon the association. The association may then rebut the allegations in
the complaint by showing why they are not monopolizing or restraining trade and
why a cease and desist order should not be issued. Id.
1993]
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their marketing power. The Act, however, places reasonable
restraints on that power. 70 Even though an activity is not pro-
tected by Capper-Volstead, the activity is not necessarily un-
lawful. Rather, the rules of reason 71 and per se illegality 72 test
the legality of a particular activity under antitrust standards.
Collective action is restricted to producers and associations
of producers. 73 The Act forbids anti-competitive agreements
and conduct between a cooperative of producers and distribu-
tors, labor officials, and other nonproducers. 74 Acquisition of
a noncooperative business may lead to antitrust liability if the
effect of the acquisition is to substantially reduce
competition.7 5
Further the Act will not protect even a single, properly struc-
tured cooperative if its actions are predatory and it obtains a
monopolistic power through anti-competitive practices rather
than through means involving its natural growth.76 Predatory
conduct is activity that is anti-competitive and has no business
justification.77 Conduct the courts have found predatory in-
cludes discriminatory pricing, coercing persons to join a coop-
erative, picketing, boycotting, and thinly veiled threats of
violence to exclude nonmembers from the market.78
Under Capper-Volstead, cooperatives are prohibited from
70. Persons producing agricultural products may act together in associations and
collectively prepare their products for market. Id. § 291. These individuals cannot,
however, form a monopoly or unreasonably restrain trade in interstate or foreign
commerce to the extent that prices are unduly enhanced. Id. § 292.
71. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. See also Legal Rights, supra note
51, at 10-2.
73. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
74. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 205 (1939). To find otherwise
would allow co-conspirators to completely control the supply of this agricultural
product. Id. This is the type of conduct that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was
designed to prevent. See Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States,
362 U.S. 458, 463 (1960). The Borden court simply stated that "[s]uch a combined
attempt of all the defendants, producers, distributors and their allies to control the
market finds no justification in § 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act." Borden, 308 U.S. at
205.
75. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 362 U.S. at 463.
76. Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1182 (1982).
77. Id. at 1183. Even lawful contracts and business activities may make up a pat-
tern of conduct that is predatory. Id.
78. See Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir.
1980); Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oysterman's Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658,
665 (5th Cir. 1956).
(Vol. 19
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unduly enhancing prices.79 Consumers are shielded from
price gouging by a cooperative that acquires substantial market
power.80 A cooperative can obtain monopoly power but can-
not abuse it.8 ' To date, no cooperative has "unduly en-
hanced" prices.
D. Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967
Collective negotiation by agricultural producers received ad-
ditional support with the enactment of the Agricultural Fair
Practices Act of 1967 (AFPA).s2 Impetus for the AFPA came
from the experiences of various grower groups in the early
1960's.3 Processors resisted efforts by Arkansas broiler pro-
ducers,84 Ohio tomato growers, 5 California fruit and vegeta-
ble growers, 6 and others to negotiate on a collective basis.
Existing laws were ineffective at balancing the market power
disparity between producers and processors.8 7
As introduced, the AFPA strongly promoted agricultural
bargaining by prohibiting unfair practices by processors., Af-
ter an extensive legislative battle, the law made the unfair prac-
tices provisions applicable to grower groups as well as
processors, and protected certain processor practices that have
curtailed producer gains.
8 9
1. Prohibited Practices
The AFPA does not give agricultural producers a free reign
in collective bargaining. Section four of the AFPA90 makes it
unlawful for any handler to engage in several courses of con-
duct.9' A handler cannot coerce a producer to join or refrain
from joining an association of producers, or refuse to deal with
79. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1988).
80. Id.
81. Fairdale Farms, 635 F.2d at 1045.
82. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-06 (1988).
83. RANDALL E. TORGERSON, PRODUCER POWER AT THE BARGAINING TABLE, A
CASE STUDY OF THE LEGISLATIVE LIFE OF S. 109 3-18 (1990).
84. Id. at 7-12 (summarizing Arkansas Broiler case).
85. Id. at 3-7 (summarizing Ohio Tomato case).
86. Id. at 12-17 (summarizing California Raisin Growers case).
87. Donald A. Frederick, Agricultural Bargaining Law: Policy in Flux, 43 ARK. L. REV.
679, 682 (1990).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 7 U.S.C. § 2303 (1988).
91. A "handler" is defined under the Act to include both buyers and producer
1993]
11
Frederick: Legal Rights of Producers to Collectively Negotiate
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
a producer because the producer joins such an association.92
Nor can a handler discriminate against a producer with respect
to price, quantity, quality, or other terms of purchasing and
handling agricultural products because the producer joins an
association.93 A handler is barred from coercing a producer to
sign or breach a contract with an association or another han-
dler,94 paying or loaning money to induce a producer not to
join or to cease belonging to an association,95 and making false
statements about the finances, management, or activities of an
association.96
2. Disclaimer Clause
Section five of the AFPA, entitled "Disclaimer of intention to
prohibit normal dealings," is the biggest obstacle to effective
producer bargaining.97 Under the disclaimer clause, a proces-
sor may not refuse to deal with a producer because that pro-
ducerjoins a cooperative association. However, the processor
can use any reasonable pretext other than association member-
ship to refuse to do business with an association member.98
Also, a handler can lawfully refuse to deal with a producer as-
sociation attempting to negotiate on behalf of its producer-
members 99
E. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 (P & S Act)'00 pro-
vides additional legal protection for livestock and poultry pro-
ducers. Under Section 202 of the P & S Act, no packer or live
poultry dealer may lawfully engage in or use any unfair, unjust
associations. Id. § 2302(a). The purpose of the Act is to establish standards of fair
practices for handlers in their dealings in agricultural products. Id. § 2301.
92. Id. § 2303(a).
93. Id. § 2303(b).
94. Id. § 2303(c).
95. Id. § 2303(d).
96. Id. § 2303(e).
97. Id. § 2304. This section provides, "[n]othing in this Chapter shall prevent
handlers and producers from selecting their customers and suppliers for any reason
other than a producer's membership in or contract with an association of producers,
nor require a handler to deal with an association of producers." Id.
98. Id.
99. Butz v. Lawson Milk, 386 F. Supp. 227, 240 (N.D. Ohio 1974). However, a
handler still cannot refuse to deal with a producer based solely upon legal justifica-
tion that the producer joined an association. Id.
100. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991).
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discriminatory, or deceptive practice.'' Nor may a packer or
dealer devise or give unreasonable preference to any person or
locality or subject any person or locality to unreasonable preju-
dice or disadvantage.1
0 2
In 1987, the P & S Act was amended to include those live
poultry dealers who"obtain[ed] live poultry by purchase or
under a poultry growing agreement."'10 3  Prior to the 1987
amendment, most of the opportunities for collective agree-
ments in the poultry industry were with integrators who did
not sell live birds and were beyond the scope of the P & S
Act. 0 4 With the 1987 amendment, 0 5 poultry grower associa-
tions now have the P & S Act as additional protection against
discriminatory conduct by processors. 10 6
IV. STATE STATUTES
A. Common Provisions
A number of states have enacted laws reflecting public policy
support for collective negotiation by agricultural producers. 0 7
While no two state laws are identical, common provisions do
appear amongjurisdictions. 0 s One standard feature is a state-
ment of prohibited or unfair practices for processors, based on
the prohibited practices Section of the AFPA.'0 9
101. Id. § 192(a).
102. Id. § 192(a).
103. Id. § 182(10).
104. See United States v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 680 F.2d 277, 279 (2nd Cir. 1982);
Bunting v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 682, 686 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
105. Pub. L. No. 100-173, 101 Stat. 917 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1988)).
106. Clay Fulcher, Vertical Integration in the Poultry Industry: The Contractual Relation-
ship, AGRIC. L. UPDATE 5 (Jan. 1992) (stating recent amendment of limited value to
contract producers).
107. See Minnesota Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act of 1973, MINN.
STAT. § 17.691 (1992); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 54401-62 (West 1986 & Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 22-3901 to 22-3906 (1977); Maine Agricultural Marketing and
Bargaining Act of 1973, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1953-1959 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1992); Michigan Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 290.701-26 (1984); New Jersey Agricultural Cooperative Associations Act,
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 4:13-1 - 50 (1973); Ohio Cooperatives Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1729.181 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.515 - 45 (1989); Washington
Agricultural Marketing and Fair Practices Act, WASH. REV. CODE Chap. 15.83.005 -
.905 (1992).
108. See infra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
109. See MINN. STAT. § 17.696(l)(a)-(f) (1992) (stating handler shall not intimidate
or discriminate against a producer through the use of unsubstantiated financial re-
ports or price fixing); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 5443 1(a)-(d) (West 1986) (prohib-
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Several states require processors to engage in "good faith"
negotiations with producer associations.' 10 While the defini-
tion of "good faith" is difficult to establish and even more diffi-
cult to enforce, commentators have developed some
guidelines."' For example, when a processor cannot find a
better offer than the one received from a producer association
but accepts an alternative offer anyway, the processor has not
bargained in "good faith."
'"12
A statute may include a specific dispute resolution mecha-
nism including mediation, conciliation or arbitration to resolve
these dilemmas.' '1 Only one state makes settlement
mandatory. 1 14 In all other jurisdictions, either party can refuse
to sign a contract."t 5
Some states include a requirement that a processor deduct a
portion of the amount due a producer and send the money
iting any interference or discrimination with a cooperative association by a produce
handler); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1965 (1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1992) (prohibit-
ing an employer or handler from interfering with a producer's right to belong to an
association); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 290.704 (1992) (stating any form of discrimination
or coercion is an unfair practice); N.J. REV. STAT. § 4:13-45 (1992) (stating it is an
unfair practice to discriminate against producers through boycotts and price fixing or
knowingly giving false financial reports); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.535 (1989) (stating no
dealer shall knowingly engage in unfair trade practices); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 15.83.030(2)-(7) (1992) (stating it is unlawful to refuse to negotiate, coerce or dis-
criminate against any producer).
110. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality that encompasses an honest
intention and the absence of a design to seek an unconscionable advantage. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990). See MINN. STAT. § 17.697(1) (1992) (stating han-
dler and producer must negotiate in good faith); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE
§ 54431 (e) (West 1986) (stating handler cannot refuse to negotiate agreement with a
cooperative association); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1958, 1965 (West 1981)
(stating handler must negotiate with an accredited producer association); MICH.
COMP. LAws §§ 290.704, 290.713 (1984) (defining good faith as the obligation to
meet and confer in a reasonable manner); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1729.192 (Ander-
son 1992) (stating it is an unfair market practice if a fruit and vegetable cooperative
fails to negotiate in good faith); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 15.83.010(7),
15.83.030(1) (1971) (stating negotiation process must be reasonable).
I11. See ISKOW, supra note 5, at 12-2.
112. Id.
113. See infra notes 114-115.
114. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-B (West Supp. 1993) (requiring
mandatory mediation and binding final arbitration).
115. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 17.697 (3) (1992) (stating if no agreement is reached,
commissioner will set time for mediation); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 54451-58
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (requiring conciliation by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation between disputing cooperatives and producers); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 290.714 - .23 (1984) (requiring arbitration when neither party is able to resolve
their differences).
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retained to the producer's association at the producer's re-
quest." 6 In two instances, an advisory committee was estab-
lished to study and report on the effectiveness of the state
act.' 
7
B. Minnesota Agricultural Contracts Law
In 1990, Minnesota enacted legislation to protect producers
from losses on major investments required to comply with a
contract for agricultural commodities."t 8 Minnesota's statute
appears to be the only statute to provide specific protection for
producers who make significant investments in reliance on
contracts offered by processors.
The law prohibits a purchaser of agricultural commodities-
except under certain circumstances-from terminating or can-
celing a contract requiring significant initial investment." 9
The purchaser may only terminate the contract if two require-
ments are met: first, the producer must receive at least 180
days advance written notice prior to the cancellation; 120 and
second, the producer must be reimbursed for damages to the
buildings or equipment originally required under the
contract.12
Minnesota law requires all contracts for an agricultural com-
modity to provide for resolution of disputes by either media-
tion or arbitration. 2 2 The statute also presumes an implied
obligation of good faith by both parties. 23 Either party may
recover damages, court costs and attorney fees if a court deter-
116. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 58451 (West 1986) (requiring payment only
if nonprofit agricultural commodity organizations are implicated); IDAHO CODE
§§ 22-3901-22-3906 (1978) (requiring deduction to be paid over to nonprofit agri-
cultural association); N.J. REV. STAT. § 4:13-26.1 (1973) (stating failure to comply
with the deduction requirement may create civil liability).
117. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 54441-46 (West 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 15.83.110 (1992) (stating committee was to report on all issues related to Act).
118. MINN. STAT. § 17.92 (1992) (applying statutory protections to investments in
buildings and equipment that cost in excess of$100,000 and have a useful life of five
years).
119. A contract may be terminated immediately if the grounds for termination are
"(1) voluntary abandonment of the contract relationship by the producer; or (2) con-
viction of the producer of an offense directly related to the business conducted under
the contract." Id. § 17.92 (3).
120. Id. § 17.92(1).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 17.91.
123. Id. § 17.94.
1993]
15
Frederick: Legal Rights of Producers to Collectively Negotiate
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
mines the contract was breached in bad faith.' 2 4
V. MICHIGAN CANNERS & FREEZERS ASSOCIATION, INC. V.
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING & BARGAINING BOARD :125
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION UNDER AFPA
As originally enacted, the Michigan Agricultural Marketing
and Bargaining Act (MAMBA)1 26 created a form of agency
shop for agriculture. 127 A producers' association-represent-
ing both a majority of the producers and a majority of the pro-
duction of a commodity in a prescribed geographic area-
could apply to the state for accreditation as the exclusive bar-
gaining agent for all producers of that commodity in that
area. 128
Upon certification, all producers of the commodity, regard-
less of whether they chose to join the association, had to abide
by the contracts the association negotiated with processors. 129
Non-members could also be required to pay a service fee to the
association. 130
Under the authority of the MAMBA,' 3 1 the Michigan Agri-
cultural Cooperative Marketing Association (MACMA)1
3 2
124. Id.
125. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
126. MICH. Comp. LAws §§ 290.701-726 (1984).
127. Michigan Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act of 1972, Mich. Pub.
Acts 344 §§ 1-10. An agency shop is a union security device requiring non-union
members to pay the equivalent of union dues and initiation fees to remain employed.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 63 (6th ed. 1990).
128. Under Michigan's system, if an association's membership constitutes more
than 50% of the producers of a particular commodity and its members' production
accounts for more than 50% of the commodity's total production, the association
may apply to the state Agricultural and Marketing and Bargaining Board for accredi-
tation as the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of that particular commod-
ity. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 466. If the Board found the
association met the qualification requirements, the board authorized the association
to act as the agent for all of the producers of that commodity, regardless of whether
they chose to become members of the association. Id. at 466-468. Nonmembers
were then required to abide by the terms of the contracts the association negotiated
with processors and to pay a service fee to the association. Id. at 468.
129. "Although the Michigan Act does not explicitly prohibit a producer repre-
sented by an accreditted association from negotiating directly with a processor, it
does prohibit the processor from negotiating with such a producer." Id. at 469.
130. Id. at 462.
131. MICH. CoMp. LAws §§ 290.701-.726 (1984).
132. MACMA is a cooperative association of producers formed to protect the
rights of its members in the market. Membership in the association is purely
voluntary.
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maintained exclusive authority as the sales and bargaining rep-
resentative for the state's asparagus producers. Accordingly,
MACMA negotiated contracts for the state's asparagus produ-
cers that bound all producers. In Michigan Canners & Freezers
Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, non-member
producers brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
the federal AFPA preempted the MAMBA provisions requiring
mandatory adherence to contracts negotiated by a producer
association.
133
The Michigan Canners and Freezers challenged the MAMBA
on three grounds. First, the association argued that the
MAMBA's provisions were pre-empted by AFPA.134 Second,
the Canners and Freezers argued that the MAMBA's provi-
sions exceeded Michigan's police power. 35 Third, the non-
member producers argued that the provisions exceeded the
scope of the Act's title and thus violated the Michigan Consti-
tution.' 36 The Michigan Supreme Court rejected all three
claims. 1
37
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, stat-
ing that the Michigan Act "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
[AFPA].'1 8 The Court further stated that the Michigan Act
coerced non-member producers to incur the same effects as
association members-a practice forbidden by AFPA. M9 This
coercion served to force non-members to become de facto
members of the association.' 4 ° Basing its decision on these
conflicts of Michigan law and the AFPA's professed purpose of
shielding producers from coercion, the Supreme Court found
the Michigan Act to be preempted by the AFPA.' 4'
133. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
332 N.W.2d 134 (Mich. 1982).
134. Id. at 136.
135. Id
136. Id.
137. Id. at 142-143.
138. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984).
139. 7 U.S.C. § 2303 (1988).
140. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 477-78.
141. Id. at 478.
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VI. POLICY OPTIONS FOR BETTER MARKETPLACE BALANCE
A. Weaknesses in Existing Law
The Capper-Volstead Act gives producers a limited antitrust
exemption to form cooperatives and collectively negotiate with
processors. 142 The AFPA and P & S Acts prevent processors
from blatantly discriminating against growers because of asso-
ciation activity.' 43 These Acts do not provide any additional
support for growers.
Several states with significant agricultural production have
found the federal statutes insufficient to adequately protect le-
gitimate grower interests. These states have enacted laws to
further promote farm bargaining.' 44 The Supreme Court's de-
cision in Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n 145 raises questions
about state laws that provide rights to producers beyond those
accorded by the AFPA or possibly conflict with the AFPA.
146
According to Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, these state laws
may be vulnerable to legal attack through preemption
principles. 1
47
The disclaimer clause of AFPA provides that "[n]othing in
this chapter shall ... require a handler to deal with an associa-
tion of producers."' 148 The provision may call into question
state statutes requiring a processor to negotiate in good faith
with a producer association. The disclaimer clause also raises
142. 7 U.S.C. § 291. See also National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436
U.S. 816 (1978) (construing Capper-Volstead Act).
143. Baldree v. Cargill, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d
1474 (1 th Cir. 1991). The president of a contract poultry growers' association, sup-
ported by USDA and the Department ofJustice, convinced the court he was termi-
nated by his processor because of association activity. Id. at 706-07. The court
issued a preliminary injunction ordering the processor to reinstate normal business
relations with the grower. Id. at 707. The court found a substantial likelihood the
grower would prove the processor's actions were unfair, unjustly discriminatory and
deceptive practices in violation of the P & S Act, 7 U.S.C. § 192, and coercion, intimi-
dation and discrimination against association members, in violation of the AFPA, 7
U.S.C. § 2303. Id. at 706.
144. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 54401-405 (West 1986); IDAHO CODE
§§ 22-3901-3906 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1953-65 (West 1981); MINN.
STAT. §§ 17.691-.701 (1992); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 4:13-3 to -50 (West 1973); OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 1729.18-.19 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.515-.545 (1989);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 15.83.005-.905 (1971).
145. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
146. Id. at 469-78.
147. Id.
148. 7 U.S.C. § 2304 (1988).
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concerns over how far a state can go in compelling a processor
to accept third-party intervention in the negotiation process.149
From the producer's perspective, other weaknesses exist in
legislation, particularly at the federal level. Under the dis-
claimer clause of the AFPA, processors can terminate producer
contracts for virtually any reason other than the producer's
participation in a cooperative. 150 Because of this narrow cov-
erage, processors could easily formulate a legitimate reason
justifying termination regardless of whether cooperative par-
ticipation was the real motivation behind the termination of
the contract.
Federal law is devoid of procedures to facilitate negotiations
between a processor and a grower association. Often, if the
parties are able to sit down and talk with a neutral, trained
outside person, differences can be resolved and amicable
agreements can be reached. While several states have under-
taken to provide professional assistance in the negotiation pro-
cess, 15 1 the federal government has not found it appropriate to
offer this service on a nationwide scale.
Penalties under federal law for violating producer rights are
modest, at best. Private parties can collect damages and attor-
ney's fees.' 52 The cost of private litigation, however, forces
most grower associations to rely on the government to pursue
their cause.
Even when the government files suit on behalf of a grower
association, the only remedy available is a civil complaint re-
149. While the disclaimer clause is neither an explicit expression of Congressional
intent to preempt state law or to occupy an entire field of regulation, neither was the
language struck down in Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n. To find preemption under
AFPA, the Supreme Court held that it need only find a provision of the Act "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bar-
gaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984). The Court focused on how "the theme of
voluntariness" in the prohibited practices section of AFPA applies to producers, but
that same approach might be expanded to disclaimer clause protections for proces-
sors. Id. at 471.
150. 7 U.S.C. § 2304.
151. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 54451-58 (West 1986) (stating Department
of Food and Agriculture supervises conciliation); ME. STAT. tit. 13, § 1958B (1989)
(stating parties must use services of State's Panel of Mediators); MICH. STAT.
§ 12.94(114)-(115) (1992) (stating Agriculture Marketing and Bargaining Board pro-
vides mediation); MINN. STAT. § 17.697(3) (1992) (stating Commissioner of Agricul-
ture facilitates mediation).
152. 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c).
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questing preventive relief to bar further illegal conduct. 153 As
a result, the Justice Department is reluctant to expend the re-
sources necessary to pursue these cases. Even if the case is
successful, the processor is no worse off than if it had not vio-
lated the law initially. Current enforcement tools provide little
inducement for voluntary compliance on the part of
processors.
Federal law does little to facilitate purposeful bargaining.
State law that exceeds the scope of the AFPA is exposed to
possible federal preemption charges. The lack of uncom-
promised public policy support puts producer associations in a
"chicken-or-the-egg" situation. Producers are reluctant to join
an association until the association has shown the ability to
withstand processor pressure. Yet, an association cannot ob-
tain significant bargaining power until its membership repre-
sents a large enough share of production that the processor
has to respect the association.
Some producer groups have developed sufficient market
presence to command processor attention. 54 Many other pro-
ducers, however, remain unorganized or unable to become a
force in their industry. A more favorable public policy toward
agricultural bargaining would facilitate stronger, more effec-
tive farmer associations.
B. Steps to Improve Producer Bargaining Power
Repealing the disclaimer clause would eliminate the AFPA
language that states that handlers and producers are not re-
quired to deal with producer associations.' 55 This repeal
would remove the cloud over state laws that promote good
faith negotiation and third party assistance in reaching a settle-
ment. In addition, repealing the disclaimer clause would re-
move any inference that processors can refuse to do business
with an association member for reasons other than member-
153. Id. § 2305(b).
154. See, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargain-
ing Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984); Baldree v. Cargill, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Fla.
1990).
155. "Nothing in this chapter shall prevent handlers and producers from selecting
their customers and suppliers for any reason other than a producer's membership in
or contract with an association of producers, nor require a handler to deal with an
association of producers." 7 U.S.C. § 2304.
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ship in the association. 156
Producers could also benefit from an amendment designat-
ing failure to bargain in good faith as a prohibited practice
under section four of the AFPA. To avoid self-contradiction,
an amendment requiring good faith bargaining should be ac-
companied by a repeal of at least that portion of the disclaimer
clause which states that handlers do not have to deal with pro-
ducer associations. 157 These amendments would insure that
some discussion or negotiation would occur. Once the parties
are talking there is reason to hope for a negotiated contract.
In addition, producers who fail to engage in honest negotia-
tion could be subject to legal action or sanctions.
Good faith, however, is a vague and subjective standard. Es-
tablishing a lack of good faith is difficult. Therefore, some ad-
ditional means of promoting good faith negotiation would be
appropriate. States that have experimented with dispute reso-
lution mechanisms have relied on involvement by a disinter-
ested third party in the negotiation process.15 8 Mediation and
conciliation have particular appeal by encouraging settlement
of disputes without disrupting the marketplace by forcing par-
ties to accept contract terms against their will. 159 One good
model for a national dispute resolution procedure is the con-
ciliation process in use in California.' 60 The conciliation pro-
cess allows any party to request conciliation. Requests are
made to a state board. If the board feels that conciliation
would be helpful, the board will appoint a conciliator. The
conciliator will promote discussion and negotiations between
the parties. However, the conciliator has no authority to make
a decision that is binding upon the parties.'1
6
Producers who farm under contract for a processor would
benefit from legislation like Minnesota's Agricultural Contracts
law.' 62 In the poultry industry, for example, farmers make
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 54451-54458 (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1956 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. § 17.91 (1992).
159. ISKOW, supra note 5, at 12-7 (stating that in most cases the decision of an
arbitration board is final and binding on the parties).
160. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 54451-54458 (West Supp. 1992).
161. Id.
162. MINN. STAT. § 17.92 (1992). Minnesota law requires that a contractor may
not terminate or cancel a contract until the producer has been given written notice
and has been reimbursed for damages incurred (this applies to investments in build-
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substantial capital investments on the promise of a processor
to provide baby chicks that the farmer raises to slaughter
weight. The farmer becomes dependent on the integrated
poultry company for birds to raise and has little power to ne-
gotiate reimbursement if the processor can cut off the grower's
supply of birds at will. Protecting the farmer's investment
against arbitrary contract termination provides the security to
engage in meaningful negotiation.
Finally, the Secretary of Agriculture should have the author-
ity to assess civil administrative penalties for AFPA and P & S
Act violations. Processors would be more careful about com-
plying with the AFPA requirements if the Secretary of Agricul-
ture had the authority to assess civil penalties for violations of
its provisions. Some state agencies have administrative en-
forcement authority. 163 Maine and Washington provide for
civil penalties of up to $5,000 for each violation of state agri-
cultural bargaining laws.164 The maximum fine in California is
$10,000.165
Other federal agricultural programs authorize USDA civil
penalties. 66 Several federal laws to promote orderly market-
ing of specific commodities empower the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to assess civil penalties of not less than $500 or more than
$5,000 for each violation.
167
Poultry and livestock producers face similar limitations
under the P & S Act.' 6 8 Although the Secretary of Agriculture
has enforcement authority over packers, there is no corre-
ings or equipment of $100,000 or more that have a useful life of more than five
years). Id.
163. In most cases, monetary penalties are enforced against parties who violate
unfair practices statutes. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 54431 (West 1986);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 1965 (West 1981); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 15.83.030 -
15.83.040 (West Supp. 1992).
164. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1959(5) (West Supp. 1992); WASH. REV.
CODE § 15.83.080 (West Supp. 1992).
165. CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 54458 (West Supp. 1993).
166. See, e.g., Egg Research and Consumer Information Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2714(b)(1)
(1988); Potato Research and Promotion Act, Id. § 2621(b)(1); Honey Research, Pro-
motion, and Consumer Information Act, Id. § 4610(b)(1).
167. Id.
168. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 192, 193, 195. Section 192 enumerates specified unlawful
practices applicable to both packers and live poultry dealers. Id. § 192. Section 193
allows the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce section 192. Id. § 193. Section 195
provides for penalties consisting of fines between $500 and $10,000, or imprison-
ment of six months to five years, or both. Id. § 195.
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sponding authority with regard to live poultry dealers. 69 Ap-
propriate administrative enforcement power at USDA would
place initial responsibility for reviewing potential violations in
the hands of those persons most familiar with the intent of the
law and who also possess the expertise to evaluate whether pu-
nitive action is appropriate in a given factual context.
VII. CONCLUSION
Collective negotiation by agricultural producers has been an
important factor in increasing farm income. Farm bargaining
is an economic self-help strategy that could be an even more
effective tool for producers if additional public policy encour-
agement were available. Producers should be given impetus to
form cooperative associations and enter into contract negotia-
tion with processors. The result would be better economic
balance in agricultural markets and a more stable and prosper-
ous farm sector.
169. Id. § 193.
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